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Recent Developments

Strickler v. Greene
Reasonable Probability that Disclosure of Withheld Evidence Would Have Led to
a Different Outcome at Trial Is Required to Obtain Relief under the Brady Rule
By Rosemary E. Allulis

T

he United States Supreme
Court held that to establish
a constitutional violation under Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),
there must be a reasonable probability
that disclosure of evidence withheld
by the prosecution would have
changed the outcome of the trial.
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263,
119 S. Ct. 1936 (1999). Affirming a
decision in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the
Court held that although the petitioner
demonstrated cause for failure to raise
a timely claim, and satisfied two ofthe
three elements of a Brady violation,
petitioner failed to establish material
prejudice sufficient to obtain relief.
In January 1990, Leanne
Whitlock ("Whitlock'') was abducted
from a Virginia shopping mall, robbed,
and brutally murdered. The murder
weapon was a sixty-nine pound rock
that was dropped on her head. Given
the weight of the rock, forensic
evidence suggested that two people
had committed the murder; one by
holding Whitlock down, the other by
dropping the rock that crushed her
skull. Police arrested and charged
Tommy Strickler ("Strickler") and
Ronald Henderson ("Henderson'') for
the three offenses. During separate
trials, the prosecutor presented
evidence from the murder scene,
Whitlock's abandoned car, and
eyewitness accounts linking both

defendants to the crime. One essential
eyewitness, Anne Stoltzfus
("Stoltzfus") provided the only
narrative account of what transpired
during the abduction. Claiming she
possessed "an exceptional memory,"
Stoltzfus confidently described in vivid
detail the aggressive and dominant role
Strickler played, portraying him as the
one who had initiated and directed the
abduction.
Although both defendants were
found guilty, Henderson was
convicted ofthe lesser offense of firstdegree murder, while Strickler was
convicted of capital murder and
sentenced to death. The Virginia
Supreme Court affirmed Strickler's
conviction and sentence. After
appointing new counsel to represent
Strickler during state habeas corpus
proceedings, the circuit court
dismissed the petition and the state
supreme court affirmed. During each
state proceeding, Strickler's attorney
relied on the prosecutor's open file
policy, believing the files contained all
information in possession of, and
known to, the state.
In 1996, Strickler filed a federal
habeas corpus petition in the United
States District Court for the Eastern
District ofVirginia The district court
granted Strickler's ex parte petition
to obtain all files that were relevant to
his case. While examining these
documents, Strickler's attorney

discovered previously undisclosed
notes taken from interviews between
a police detective and Stoltzfus, which
the attorney concluded could have
significantly impeached Stoltzfus's
credibility. A comparison of her
testimony and the documents would
have revealed the disparity between
Stoltzfus's detailed description ofthe
violent abduction, and her previously
''vague memory" ofthe same incident
that she ''totally wrote [] offas a trivial
episode of college kids carrying on."
Strickler contended that because the
documents contained critical
exculpatory and impeaching evidence
that was withheld from defense
counsel, the resulting Brac6;violation
rendered
his
conviction
constitutionally invalid
The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of
Strickler, holding that the
prosecution's failure to disclose the
documents amounted to prejudice
sufficient to undermine confidence in
the verdict. However, the United
States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reversed the district
court, holding that the Brady claim
was procedurally flawed because
Strickler failed to raise it during state
proceedings. Alternatively, the court
of appeals held that the evidence
would not have materially affected
Strickler's conviction or sentence.
The United States Supreme Court
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granted certiorari to determine: 1)
whether there was a Brady violation;
2) whether there was sufficient cause
for the procedural default by raising
the Brady claim; and 3) whether the
undisclosed evidence prejudiced
Strickler's right to a fair trial.
The Supreme Court began its
analysis with a discussion of the
essential elements ofa Brady violation.
Strickler, 527 U.S. at _ _, 119 S.
Ct. at 1948. TheBradyrulerequires
the prosecution to disclose all
evidence favorable to an accused,
where that evidence is material to
either guilt or punishment. Id (citing
Bradyv. Maryland, 373 U.S. at 87).
The ,rule encompasses both
exculpatory and impeachment
evidence known to anyone acting on
behalfofthe government that has been
withheld either purposefully or
inadvertently, regardless ofwhether it
was requested. Id (citing United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,676
(1985); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S.
419,437 (1995». The Court noted
that a true Brady violation does not
result, however, unless the accused
establishes prejudice by meeting the
"reasonable probability" standard that
suppressed evidence would have
produced a different verdict had it
been disclosed to the defense. Id
The Supreme Court held that in
the instant case, two of the three
essential elements ofa Brady violation,
the prosecution's failure to disclose
documents to the defense, and the
impeaching character ofthat evidence,
were "unquestionably established."
Id. The Court was also satisfied that
Strickler showed cause sufficient to
excuse the procedural default. Id. at

_ , 119 S. Ct. at 1952. The Court
stated that by relying on the
prosecutor's open file policy,
Strickler was justified in believing the
file would contain everything known
to the state. Id.
In narrowing the issue to
whether Strickler satisfied the
"materiality" element of Brady, the
Court noted that "without a doubt,"
Stoltzfus's testimony made Strickler's
conviction "more likely than not,"
without which the outcome ofthe trial
"might have" been different. Id. To
obtain relief, however, the Court
reiterated the correct standard as
being a "reasonable probability" of a
different outcome, and not a "more
likely than not" standard. Id. The
question, thus, was whether the
"favorable evidence could reasonably
be taken to put the whole case in such
a different light as to undermine
confidence in the verdict." Id.
(quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435).
Applying this standard to the facts of
the case, the Supreme Court held that
Strickler failed to satisfy his burden.
Id. at _ , 119 S. Ct. at 1955.
Although a "reasonable possibility"
of a different outcome existed,
Strickler's burden was to establish a
"reasonableprobabi/ity." Id. at_,
119 S. Ct. at 1953 (quoting Kyles,
514 U.S. at 434).
In his dissenting opinion, Justice
Souter parted company with the
majority, concluding that Strickler mid
satisfied his burden with respect to the
sentence. Id at _ , 119 S. Ct. at
1956. Reiterating that the materiality
analysis does not end at the conviction
stage, he maintained that there was a
reasonable probability that

impeachment of Stoltzfus' s testimony
would have swayed at least one juror
away from recommending the death
sentence. Id During the sentencing
phase, Justice Souter reasoned, it was
likely that Stoltzfus's testimony
portraying Strickler as the ringleader
influenced the jury's assessmentofhis
future dangerousness. Id. at ---' 119
S. Ct. at 1960.
Justice Souter emphasized that
the continued use of the shorthand
term "reasonable probability" creates
the risk of confusing the correct
standard. Id. at _ , 119 S. Ct. at
1956. Suggesting "significant
possibility" as a better standard,
Justice Souter opined that this
alternative would more clearly
demonstrate the degree to which
undisclosed evidence actually
undermined a verdict or sentence. Id.
at_, 119 S. Ct. at 1957.
With its decision in Strickler v.
Greene, the United States Supreme
Court has firmly established the
standard for obtaining relief under
Brady as a "reasonable probability"
that the outcome would be different.
Although the Court stresses the
special role of prosecutors to ensure
justice through truth, the use of this
ambiguous nomenclature leaves little
promise for the truly innocent in the
face of an erroneous decision.
Likewise, the application ofthis vague
standard during the sentencing phase
could mean the difference between life
and death.
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